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Even a Tax Collector Should Have Some
Heart:*

Equitable Relief for the Innocent
Spouse Under I.R.C. § 6013(e)
L.

J. TIMOTHY PHILIPPS**
BRADFORD BRAFORD***

I.

INTRODUCTION

Mrs. Nancy B. LaBelle faced an unexpected financial crisis.' The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had informed Mrs. LaBelle that she
owed nearly $380,000 in additional taxes and penalties for tax year
1973.2 Mrs. LaBelle, a teacher of learning-disabled children in public
school, did not have the money to pay the bill, much less the interest
due on it.
Mrs. LaBelle had married Donald A. LaBelle in January 1957.
Mr. LaBelle became a used car dealer sometime around 1965 and
branched out into the new car business in 1971. In early 1973 the
LaBelles separated, and in August 1973 an interlocutory judgment of
dissolution of the marriage was filed. A marital settlement agreement
incorporated into the interlocutory judgment provided, inter alia, that
the parties would file joint federal income tax returns for all taxable
years prior to the year in which a final judgment of dissolution was
obtained.' The judgment further provided that Mrs. LaBelle would
*

Breitenstein, J., in Dakil v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir.

1974).

** Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; B.S. 1962, Wheeling
College; J.D. 1965, Georgetown University; L.L.M. 1966, Harvard University. The
authors express appreciation to the Frances Lewis Law Center for its grant supporting
the research for this article.
*** Research Associate, Frances Lewis Law Center, B.S., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington and Lee
University.
1. See LaBelle v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-069, 260, (1984), rev'd
by unpublished order, (9th Cir. 1984), on remand, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-602, 2817
(1986).
2. LaBelle, 53 T.C.M. (PH) at 261.

3. Id.
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receive a modest marital settlement, while Mr. LaBelle was to retain
4
the family residence.
The final judgment of dissolution was entered in January 1974.
In March 1974, Mrs. LaBelle provided Mr. LaBelle with her W-2
forms and a list of deductions for 1973 so that he could file their tax
return in conformity with their settlement agreement. 5
In June 1977 the LaBelles executed a power of attorney appointing one Peter J. Celeste, Esquire, as their attorney in fact for all tax
matters for tax years 1971 to 1973. At the time she signed the power
of attorney, Mrs. LaBelle believed that the 1973 tax return had been
filed. She thought that the power of attorney was for dealing with an
audit from which they would get a refund. In fact, the 1973 return,
signed by Mr. LaBelle, was not filed until June 1975. Mrs. LaBelle's
signature was entered by Mr. Celeste acting under the power of
attorney. Mrs. LaBelle did not learn until August 1980 that the 1973
return had been filed late. 6 The deficiency asserted against Mrs.
LaBelle by the IRS arose largely because Mr. LaBelle had overstated
the cost of goods sold from his automobile business, resulting in an
understatement of gross profit from the business on the 1973 return. 7
Anyone untrained in the ways of the federal income tax laws and
with an ordinary sense of fairness would likely have thought this
asserted deficiency was surely some egregious bureaucratic foul-up.
Perhaps the IRS computers had gone amok, or the 1973 returns had
been put in the wrong in-basket. After all, the understatement of
gross profit was entirely Mr. LaBelle's doing. It was his automobile
business, and he had taken responsibility for filing the returns.
Although Mrs. LaBelle had kept books for the used car business,
she had taken no part in Mr. LaBelle's new car business which
produced the tax deficiency. She was separated from Mr. LaBelle for
almost all of 1973 and had not received any income or benefits from
Mr. LaBelle's business during those years. In fact, during the entire
course of their marriage, Mrs. LaBelle had not received all that much
in the way of material benefit from Mr. LaBelle's business. She had
to use her own public school teacher's salary to pay for many of the
LaBelles' household expenses.' Nor did she know that Mr. LaBelle
4. Mrs. LaBelle was to receive $7,000 cash in installments, furniture and
fixtures from the family residence, a $10,000 insurance policy, and use of a car. Id.
5. Mrs. LaBelle's W-2 showed wages of $12,797 and federal taxes withheld of
$1,998. Id.
6. Id. at 261.

7. Id. at 261-62.

8. LaBelle v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)

86-602, 2817 (1986).
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had overstated his cost of goods sold. She had not even signed the
tax return personally. She understood that the power of attorney she
had given Celeste was for dealing with an audit, the result of which
was to be a refund. Her salary as a teacher was modest. How could
she be expected to pay a tax bill of nearly $380,000, plus interest,
that resulted from the wrongdoing of a husband from whom she had
long since been divorced?
According to the Tax Court, paying that tax bill is precisely what
Mrs. LaBelle was required to do under the law as it stood at the time
her case was first decided. 9 The Internal Revenue Code expressly
provided that a husband and wife filing a joint federal income tax
return are jointly and severally liable for the full tax liability. 0 The
court found that the LaBelles had filed a joint return, despite the fact
that Mrs. LaBelle's signature had been placed on the return by Mr.
Celeste under a power of attorney that had been obtained under
questionable circumstances. The Tax Court found that all the facts
and circumstances indicated Mrs. LaBelle intended to file a joint
return." The only possible relief for Mrs. LaBelle was under the
"innocent spouse" provision of section 6013(e) 12 which provided relief
in certain cases where an omission from gross income by the noninnocent spouse had occurred. However, Mrs. LaBelle was ineligible
for relief under that provision because the Tax Court found that an
overstatement of cost of goods sold was not equivalent to an omission
from gross income under the statute as then constituted. 3 With regret,
the Tax Court held that Mrs. LaBelle must indeed pay the tax bill
resulting from her husband's misconduct.14
Clearly, requiring Mrs. LaBelle to pay the tax bill under the
circumstances of her case runs counter to most persons' intuitive sense
of fairness. Over the years many cases have arisen where one spouse
has been held liable for tax liability resulting from actions of the
other spouse, even though imposition of liability in the particular
situation runs contrary to generally held notions of fairness. This
9. See LaBelle v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-069, 260 (1984).
10. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6013(d). The Internal Revenue Code of
1986 contains the identical provision. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(3) (Supp. 1986). References to
the Internal Revenue Code hereafter will be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
or corresponding provisions of the 1954 Code unless otherwise specified.
11. LaBelle, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) at 262.
12. I.R.C. § 6013(e).
13. LaBelle, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) at 263. Fortunately for Mrs. LaBelle, § 6013(e)
was amended while her case was on appeal in such a way as to make her elegible for
innocent spouse relief. See infra notes 58, 105.
14. Id. at 264.
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article will discuss the origins and history of the innocent spouse
problem. It will further discuss and evaluate efforts that have been
made to resolve the problem. Finally, this article will suggest ways in
which the present state of the law with respect to innocent spouses
can be improved.
II.

PRE-1971 LAW

Prior to 1938, the Internal Revenue Code did not expressly state

the type of liability that accompanied the filing of a joint tax return. 5

The Bureau of Internal Revenue, as the Internal Revenue Service was
then styled, contended that married couples who filed joint returns
were jointly and severally liable for the whole tax and any penalties.16
Married taxpayers, however, often contended that liability should be

allocated according to individual income. 7 The courts arrived at
several different conclusions, 8 but the matter was not settled until the
15. Section 51(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928 and the comparable sections
in other pre-1938 Revenue Acts merely allowed couples to file a joint return. The
section made no mention of the type of liability that would attach. Prior to 1948,
filing a joint return did not bring with it the income splitting advantages of present
day joint returns.
16. See Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940); Crowe
v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796, 797 (7th Cir. 1936); Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d
485, 487 (9th Cir. 1935); Rogers v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 16, 24 (1938); I.T.
1575, 11-1 C.B. 144 (1923).
17. See supra note 16.
18. In 1931, the Fifth Circuit, in Anderson v. United States, 48 F.2d 201 (5th
Cir. 1931), held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had no obligation to
divide a joint return into two separate returns and, therefore, upheld joint and several
liability.
Three other Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, held that a married couple
was not jointly and severally liable after filing a joint return. The Ninth Circuit, in
Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), held that taxes should be allocated
according to income rather than imposing joint and several liability. The Cole court
stated that fundamental principles of taxation required that income tax should be
levied in proportion to income. Id. at 489. The Ninth Circuit quoted a Board of Tax
Appeals opinion which held that a couple did not lose any of their individual rights
by accepting the privilege of filing a joint return. Id. at 487, quoting Fawsett v.
Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 139, 142 (1934). In Crowe v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796
(7th Cir. 1936), the Seventh Circuit held that, despite the language in the statute that
might imply otherwise, the Ninth Circuit's Cole decision was sound and that liability
was not joint and several. Id. at 798. Likewise, the Second Circuit, in Commissioner
v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1940), also determined that pre-1938 law did not
impose joint and several liability on couples filing joint returns. Id. at 641. The
Rabenold court believed that the statute only implied joint and several liability, id.
at 640, and cited Supreme Court cases holding that tax statutes should not be
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Revenue Act of 1938 expressly established joint and several liability. 19
The Revenue Act of 1938 expressly required that married couples
filing joint returns be held jointly and severally liable for the tax
due. 20 Under the 1938 Act, the decision to file joint returns was left
to the couple. In 1941, a proposed bill would have made joint returns
mandatory for married couples. 21 However, apparently in mitigation
of the mandatory nature of the proposal, couples would have been
given the choice between having their taxes calculated individually on
their apportioned income or having joint and several liability. 22 Mandatory joint returns would have caused one spouse's income to be
added cumulatively to the other spouse's. Because there was only one
rate schedule at the time, this would have resulted in the couple's
income being taxed at higher marginal rates than if each filed separately, thereby resulting in a tax increase for many two-income
couples. Consequently, the proposal met with a firestorm of opposi23
tion and never became law.
The mandatory joint return proposal was intended to result in a
more equitable distribution of the tax burden by eliminating the tax
advantage enjoyed by residents of community property states over
residents of common law states. Married residents of community
property states were taxed at lower rates because community income
was allocated equally between the couple and thus fell into lower
marginal tax brackets. 24
extended by implication. Id., citing Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917);
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 61 (1930).
After Cole, the Board of Tax Appeals decided that joint and several liability
should be imposed in cases where the income could not be allocated between the
couple. Rogers v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 16, 26 (1938); Celia Seders v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874 (1938). Subsequently, in 1941, the Court of Claims held that
the 1932 Revenue Act imposed joint and several liability. Moore v. United States, 37
F. Supp. 136, 140 (Ct. Cl. 1941). The Court of Claims based this conclusion on two
Supreme Court cases which used the married couple as a tax calculating unit. Id. at
139. See Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940) (charitable contributions combined
for purposes of deduction limit); Helvering v. Janny, 311 U.S. 189 (1940) (one
spouse's net losses set off against other spouse's net gain in sale of capital assets to
determine tax liability). The Court of Claims believed this entailed joint and several
liability.
19. Revenue Act of 1938 § 51(b), 52 Stat. 476 (1938).
20. Id.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), reprintedin 1941-2
CB 413, 420-24.

22. Id. at 444.
23. See R. PAUL,

TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES

24. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).

495-96 (1954).
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The 1948 Revenue Act resolved the community property problem
by changing the manner in which income tax is calculated on a joint
return. 25 The new formula calculated the tax by doubling the tax on
half of the couple's combined net taxable income. 26 This put married
couples in a lower marginal bracket than a single person with the
same income. Residents of community property states and common
law states, thereby, were put on a tax parity by extending the benefits
of community property law to common law taxpayers. As part of the
new regime, joint and several liability was continued on the ground
that it was administratively necessary. 27 However, Congress did not
specifically detail the administrative necessity behind this decision.
Moreover, in view of the history of joint and several liability on joint
returns and the fact that the 1941 mandatory joint return proposal
permitted apportioned liability, it is not clear that joint and several
liability was in fact necessary. Nevertheless, joint and several liability
had become embedded in the statute.
Between 1948 and 1971, the courts could do little to prevent the
imposition of joint and several liability to avoid inequitable results.
The IRC included no provisions for equitable relief that would relieve
an innocent spouse from liability. Although courts wanted to help the
innocent spouse, most courts believed that their hands were tied
without specific statutory guidelines. The issue became prominent in
the 1960's when, following the decision in James v. United States,28
the Service began to impose liability on an innocent spouse for the
other spouse's embezzled income.
The Sixth Circuit, in a series of three opinions, tried to ameliorate
the harshness of the statute. In Scudder v. Commissioner,29 the
husband embezzled money from his wife and her sisters. The embezzled money was not reported as income on the couple's joint return.
The Commissioner argued that only Congress was in a position to
relieve the wife from liability for the resulting tax deficiency. The Tax
Court had recognized that the wife would not be liable if the return
was not a valid joint return. This would be the case if her signature
on the return had been obtained through duress or fraud. However,
the Tax Court held that the husband's fraud in obtaining the money
did not carry over to his procurement of the wife's signature on the
25. See R. PAUL, supra note 23 at 496.
26. Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948).
27. See R. PAUL,. supra note 23 at 496.
28. 366 U.S. 213 (1961). James held that embezzled funds must be included in
gross income.
29. 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969).
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return. Since invalidity of the joint return was the only ground for
relief, the Tax Court "with considerable reluctance" held the wife
liable. 30 The Sixth Circuit stated that the Tax Court had underestimated its powers when the Tax Court concluded that section 6013(d)
left no room for amelioration. According to the Sixth Circuit, the
execution of the joint return by the husband was in itself the equivalent
in wrong of duress, fraud, or trickery sufficient to relieve the wife of
3
liability. '
In Huelsman v. Commissioner,3 2 the Sixth Circuit continued the
examination of the innocent spouse problem. Huelsman's husband
embezzled money that the petitioner did not know about nor benefit
from.33 The Tax Court held that it had no equitable power to grant
relief, although it again recognized that a signature obtained through
duress, forgery, or trickery could act as a defense to invalidate a joint
return. 4 In view of this equitable defense, the Sixth Circuit remanded
the case and prodded the Tax Court to take a more expansive view
36
of its power to provide relief.35 Finally, in Sharwell v. Commissioner,
the Sixth Circuit remanded a similar innocent spouse case for further
development of the factual issues, relying on the authority of Scudder
and Huelsman.
III.

1971

LEGISLATION

The Scudder, Huelsman and Sharwell cases highlighted the need
for some relief from strict application of joint and several liability
under section 6013(d). In 1971 Congress responded by enacting the
predecessor of the current section 6013(e). 37 The Committee reports
30. 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967).
31. 405 F.2d at 226.
32. 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 478.
34. See id. at 480-81.
35. Id. at 481.
36. 419 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063 § 1 (1971). The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 § 6013(e) provided as follows:
(e) SPOUSE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES
(1) IN GENERAL
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate,
if(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable
year and on such return there was omitted from gross income an
amount properly includable therein which is attributable to one spouse
and which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income
stated in the return,
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noted that "administrative necessity" makes a general rule of joint
and several liability on a joint return necessary and appropriate in
most situations.38 However, the Committee reports also noted that
"numerous cases" had arisen under the strict rule that had resulted
in "grave injustice." ' 9 They specifically alluded to situations in which
one spouse, without the other spouse's knowledge, had embezzled
funds, squandered the money and deserted the other spouse. Congress,
apprised of these particular situations, enacted legislation tailored to
meet them. The legislation's purpose was "to correct the unfairness
in the situations brought to the attention of [Congress] and to bring
government tax collection practices into accord with basic principles
40
of equity and fairness."
(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return: he or
she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission,
and
(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse significantly benefited directly or indirectly from the items omitted from gross
income and taking into account all other facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for
such taxable year attributable to such omission,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the
extent that such liability is attributable to such omission from gross
income.
(2) SPECIAL RULES. For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attributable shall
be made without regard to community property laws, and
(B) the amount omitted from gross income shall be determined
in the manner provided by section 6501(e)(l)(A).
Id. The same legislation also enacted the predecessor of current § 6653(d). This
provision relieved an innocent spouse of the fraud penalty where none of the
underpayment of tax was "due to the fraud of such spouse." This relief could apply
even where § 6013(e) relief was not available. The relief afforded by the legislation
was made available to all still open cases and years. Pub. L. No. 91-679,, 84 Stat.
2063 § 3 (1971).
38. H.R. Rep. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). The language of the House and Senate Reports is virtually
identical. Neither report specified the "administrative necessity" that made joint and
several liability necessary.
39. H.R. Rep., supra note 38 at 2; S. Rep., supra note 38 at 2.
40. Id. The remedial and equitable purpose of the legislation was also emphasized during action on the House floor. See 116 CONG. REc. 43,350-51 (Daily ed.
Dec. 22, 1970) (statement of Rep. Boggs):
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Ways and Means is convinced that the
changes that would be brought by H.R. 19774 are necessary to simple equity
and justice from the administration of our tax laws.
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The conditions placed on innocent spouse relief basically tracked
the circumstances of the fraud and embezzlement situations. The
conditions were that 1) a joint return was filed; 2) there was an
omission from gross income attributable to one spouse of more than
25 per cent of the gross income reported on the return; 3) the innocent
spouse establishes that in making the return that he or she did not
actually know of and had no reason to know of the omission; and 4)
taking into account whether or not the innocent spouse significantly
benefited from the omitted income, and all other facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for the
deficiency in tax. Essentially, these factors can be characterized as the
joint return requirement, the substantial omission of income requirement, the lack of knowledge requirement, and the benefit/equity
requirement. All of these requirements had to be present for relief to
be granted.4 Some of these requirements have on occasion posed
serious obstacles to the equitable purpose of the legislation.
A.

JOINT RETURN REQUIREMENT

The requirement of a joint return posed few problems, since in
the usual case no liability is imposed on an innocent spouse if joint
returns are not filed. 42 In certain community property situations,
however, the joint return requirement produced an anomalous result.
In Galliher v. Commissioner,43 a husband and wife who were residents
of a community property state filed separate income tax returns,
because the husband refused to file a joint return." The wife, who
was under a physical disability, omitted from her separate return
income of which she had no specific knowledge and from which she
did not significantly benefit. 4 5 The wife was granted a divorce from
her husband in the year after the tax year in question.
The Service asserted a deficiency against wife based on her
community share of the income omitted from her return. The Tax
41. Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760, 761 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
988 (1975); Allen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 125, 129 (1973), modified, 514 F.2d 908
(5th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973); Sonnenborn v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 381 (1971).
42. See § 6013(d) imposing joint and several liability only if a joint return is
filed.
43. 62 T.C. 760 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 988 (1975). Accord, Williams v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-166, 681 (1979); Fehland v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (P-H) 75-300 (1975); Coffman v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74308, 1343 (1974).
44. 62 T.C. at 762 n.3.
45. Id. at 760-61.
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Court denied the wife relief under section 6013(e), because a joint
return had not been filed, even though she met all the other requirements of that section."6 Although the equities were clearly on the
wife's side, the express words of the statute mandated that, to qualify
for its relief, a joint return must have been filed. 47 Therefore, liability
was imposed on a wife who filed a separate return in a situation
where liability would not have been imposed had a joint return been
filed.
Congress has subsequently enacted a statutory provision similar
to section 6013(e) to deal with the community property situation. 41
Therefore, the anomalous result of Galliher should not occur again.
B. SUBSTANTIAL OMISSION OF INCOME REQUIREMENT

The 1971 legislation required that, for innocent spouse relief to
apply, there be an omission of income attributable to the non-innocent
spouse "which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return. ' 49 Presumably, the requirement was

46. Id. at 763-64.
47. Id.
48. Congress enacted § 66(c), Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(b)(1), 98 Stat. 803
(1984), which provides the following:
(c) Spouse Relieved of Liability in Certain Other Cases.-Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary, if(1) an individual does not file a joint return for any taxable
year,
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for such
taxable year an item of community income properly includible therein
which, in accordance with the rules contained in section 879(a), would
be treated as the income of the other spouse,
(3) the individual establishes that he or she did not know of,
and had no reason to know of, such item of community income, and
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include such item of community income in such individual's
gross income,
then, for purposes of this title, such item of community income shall be
included in the gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross
income of the individual).
Prior to 1984 § 66(a), Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 3521-22 (1980), provided
relief only in the limited "abandoned spouse" situation where husband and wife
lived apart for a whole calendar year. The 1984 legislation also added § 66(b) which
provides relief in situations where the spouse appropriates community income to
himself or herself and fails to notify the other spouse of such income.
49. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 6013(e)(1)(A) prior to 1984 amendment.
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included in order to screen out cases where the amounts of income
and tax involved were relatively small.50
As might be expected from a condition unrelated to the equities
of a given situation, the substantial omission of income requirement
sometimes resulted in decisions that ran contrary to an intuitive sense
of fairness. The problem was exacerbated because the statutory definition of substantial omission of income in section 6013(e) incorporated by reference the definition of substantial omission in section
6501(e)(1)(A). Section 6501(e)(1) extends the statute of limitations for
assessing an income tax deficiency from three years to six years when
there has been a substantial omission from gross income. The purpose
of that section is entirely unrelated to the purpose of section 6013(e).
Section 6501(e) is in effect a sanction provision that penalizes a
taxpayer by extending the statute of limitations. Section 6013(e) is a
remedial provision intended to provide relief from tax liability in
appropriate circumstances.
An example of the problems associated with the substantial
omission of income requirement is described in Estate of Klein v.
Commissioner.5 In Klein, husband reported his income on form 1040
as $91,531 and the parties stipulated that the omitted income was
$45,733. According to the taxpayer's calculations the omitted income
would be over 49 percent of their reported personal income. Husband
owned 30 per cent of a partnership. The Service contended that
section 6501 required that the "amount reported on the return"
should include 30 percent of the partnership's gross income that had
been reported on the partnership returns. The IRS calculation yielded
a gross income reported on the return of $1,106,896.52
The Service reasoned that since the business was a partnership
and partnerships are not taxable entities, the partnership's gross
income passed through to the individual partners. Therefore, the
partnership's information return and the Kleins' personal income tax
return had to be read together. Together, the partnership return and
the Kleins' personal return showed gross income in excess of $1,000,000.
The $45,773 omission was, therefore, only about 4.1 per cent of "the
amount of gross income stated in the return." 5 3 The court accepted
the Service's argument and denied relief, even though the parties had
50. The committee reports state that the requirement "is intended to limit the

relief provided ...

to those cases where the income omitted represents a significant

amount relative to the reported income." H. Rep. at 3; S. Rep. at 3.
51. 537 F.2d 701 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
52. Id at 702-03.
53. Id.
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stipulated that Mrs. Klein did not know of and had no reason to
know of the omission, and that it would be inequitable to hold her
liable for the deficiency.14 The court based its decision on cases
(favorable to the taxpayer) interpreting the phrase "amount of gross
income stated in the return" under section 6501(e)(1)(A) 5
The LaBelle 6 case is another example of an inequitable result
caused by the substantial omission of income requirement. There was
no doubt that Mrs. LaBelle's situation cried out for equitable. relief.
However, the Tax Court denied her petition, ruling that she had
failed to meet the substantial omission test.17
The Tax Court noted that the tax deficiency resulted from Mr.
LaBelle's overstatement of cost of goods sold, resulting in an understatement of gross profit from his business. Section 6501(e)(1)(A)
(incorporated by reference into section 6013(e)) defines gross income
as all receipts "prior to diminution by the cost of ... sales." 58 Mr.
LaBelle had not omitted any gross receipts. He had overstated cost
of goods sold. Consequently, he had not omitted gross income under
the statutory definition. 9 Several other cases have produced similar
inequitable results under the substantial omission of income requirement. 60 A related defect in the prior law was that relief was only
available in cases where there had been an omission from income.
Therefore, an innocent spouse subjected to liability because of an
overstated deduction, for example, was not eligible for relief. 61
C.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT

Unlike substantial omission of income, the lack of knowledge
requirement is directly related to the equity of granting innocent

54. Id. at 702.
55. Id. at 704. See also Wolk v. Commissioner, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) 4-5306
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (similar result for joint venture). But cf. Ketchum v. Commissioner,
697 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1982) (different result for S corporation income under pre1983 law).
56. LaBelle v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (PH) 84-069, 260 (1984).
57. Id. at 263.
58. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
59.. LaBelle, 53 T.C.M. (PH) at 263-64.

60. E.g., Douglas v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-369, 1424, 1427
(1984) (deductions do not equal omissions); Fields v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (PH) 81-653, 2536, 2539 (1981) (24.96% does not round to 25%); Klayman v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-408, 1578, 1584 (1979).
61. Allen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 125, 132 (1973).
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spouse relief. 62 Nevertheless, a few cases have arisen under the lack
of knowledge requirement that run counter to a sense of fairness. The
statute requires not only that the putative innocent spouse lack actual
knowledge of the omission, but also that the spouse "had no reason
to know of" the omission.6 3 Imputed knowledge on the part of the
spouse could, therefore, prevent innocent spouse relief. In many
instances the spouse has been able to establish a lack of actual

knowledge, often based on the court's evaluation of that spouse's
credibility.6 However, it has been more difficult to establish a lack
of imputed knowledge. Although many cases seem to have come to a
fair result on this issue, 65 a few have not.
. A vivid example is found in Estate of Jackson v. Commissioner.6
In Jackson the husband was a narcotics dealer who maintained
girlfriends in apartments in at least three different locations. The
wife, who had a sixth grade education, "knew nothing about their
finances and was physically abused by [the husband] when she inquired as to the inflow and outflow of funds."61 7 Nevertheless, the
Tax Court held that although the wife had no actual knowledge of
the husband's omission of income from the return, she should have
known about it because she was aware of several large expenditures
68
the husband had made during the year.
62. A spouse, fully knowledgeable of the omission from income that occasions
the deficiency can hardly be deemed innocent. It is thus not inequitable, in the
absence of some unusual circumstance, to impose liability on that knowledgeable
spouse.
63. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 6013(e)(l)(B). The current statute retains
a lack of knowledge requirement. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C).
64. E.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1975) (district
court judge's opinion not clearly erroneous); Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164,
1170 (1979); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 694 (1972); Guth v. Commissioner,
56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-522, 2828, 2830 (1987) (spouse's testimony credible); Cox v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 182-723, 3138, 3142 (1982); Ratner v. Commisgioner,
50 T.C.M. (P-H) 181-333, 1169, 1178 (1981); Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1 76-122, 545, 548 (1976) (satisfied by testimony adduced at trial); Grosso v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 80-186, 867, 870 (1980); Feingold v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) J 80-163, 770, 772 (1980).
65. E.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1975); Terzian
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1172 (1979); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680,
698 (1972); Cox v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 82-723, 3138, 3143 (1982);
Grosso v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 80-186, 867, 872 (1980); Feingold v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (PH) 180-163, 770, 772 (1980); Zinser v. Commissioner,
47 T.C.M. 178-256, 1096, 1099 (1978); Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H)
76-121, 541, 546 (1976).
66. 72 T.C. 356 (1979).
67. Id. at 359-70.
68. See id.
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The wife had argued that it would be inequitable to hold her

liable for the large amount ($36,000) in question. But, the Tax Court
responded that "inequitability is not" the test under the law. 69 Jackson
is a case where a factor, otherwise reasonable to take into account in
determining the equities, actually produced inequity when that factor
was written into the statute as a sine qua non for relief. Although
imputed knowledge is a factor that bears on the equity of granting
relief it is not necessarily conclusive, as Jackson illustrates.
Actual knowledge or imputed knowledge on the part of the
spouse is a factual question.7 0 Determination of actual knowledge is
largely a matter of the spouse's credibility." The standard for imputed
knowledge is not entirely clear. It is clear that the courts have generally

adopted an objective reasonable person standard. 72 However, it is not

clear to what extent this standard is tempered by an element of
subjectivity.
For example, in Mysse v. Commissioner,7 the court did not
impute knowledge to a wife claiming innocent spouse status because
the husband's expenditures were "not of such character as to cause a

reasonably prudent person with [the wife's] knowledge of the family
finances to question the source of the funds." This appears to be an

objective standard that does not take into account the spouse's native

intelligence or education. However, the Mysse court itself noted that
the spouse there was "a housewife without business knowledge." ' 74
Moreover, it is clear from other cases that the spouse's level of
education and native intelligence are taken into account in determining

what the spouse reasonably should have known. 71

69. Id. at 362.
70. Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1986); Ratana v.
Commissioner, 662 F.2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1981); Kent v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(P-H) 86-149, 638, 642 (1986); Cedrone v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86089, 348, 360 (1986); Cruea v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85-552, 2462, 2469
(1985).
71. See supra note 63.
72. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975) adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY definition of reason to know:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he had information from which a
person of ordinary intelligence which such person may have, or of the
superior intelligence which such person may have, would infer that the fact
in question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its existence
that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question,
his action would be predicated upon the assumption of its possible existence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 (1958).
73. 57 T.C. 680, 698-99 (1972).
74. Id. at 698.
75. Innocent spouse relief denied: Alvarez v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
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A more unsettled question is the degree to which subjective
factors other than intelligence or education, such as the spouse's
emotional state, should be taken into account. In Sanders v. United
States,76 the innocent spouse was a high school educated wife who
was having severe emotional problems exacerbated by heavy alcohol
consumption during the period in issue. The government argued that
the taxpayer had the burden to prove that she was "completely without
fault and could not possibly have discovered the item before executing
the returns." ' 77 The taxpayer contended that the standard should be
"what a reasonable person in taxpayer's subjective position would
have discovered.' '78
The Fifth Circuit listed the taxpayer's emotional state among the
factors it considered and stated that because the statute is intended to
remedy a perceived injustice, it should not give the provision "an
unduly narrow or restrictive reading." ' 79 This indicates that the tax86-581, 2712, 2713 (1986) (1 semester college); Urbanski v. Commissioner, 55
T.C.M. (P-H) 86-551, 2579, 2580 (1986) (high school graduate and police officer);
Blinderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-536, 2515, 2517 (1986) (B.A.
education); Cedrone v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-089, 348, 349 (1986) (1
year business school); Quave v. Commissioner,. 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85-007, 26, 29
(1985) (high school graduate, 2 yr. course bookkeeping); Connelly v. Commissioner,
51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82-644, 2863 (1982) (10th grade education).
Innocent spouse relief granted: Walker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86278, 1196, 1243 (1986) (high school graduate, wife money manager); DeMartino v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-263, 1103, 1104 (1986) (high school graduate
but husband involved in futures market); Quint v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H)
85-226, 1000, 1001 (1985) (high school graduate and continuing education courses);
Lubrano v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84-014, 51 (1984) (high school
equivalent); Ratner v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81-333, 1169, 1170 (1981)
(high school graduate); Johnson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80-569, 2405,
2505-06 (high school graduate, degree in welding); Zinser v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(P-H) 78-256, 1096, 1097 (1978) (wife was high school graduate, husband had
M.D.); Hackney v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76-099, 411, 412 (1976) (3
months of high school).
Intelligence: Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1986) (innocent
spouse relief denied using test in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 commentary
d (1954)); Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1975) (innocent
spouse relief granted using Restatement test); Junker v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M.
(P-H) 87-103, 534, 536 (1987) (innocent spouse relief denied; obvious intelligence
and fact that spouse was college graduate); Shapiro v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
86-142, 621, 623 (1986) (innocent spouse relief denied; mature and intelligent
woman).

76. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 166.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 166-67. In a footnote the court said that it did not interpret the
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payer's emotional condition is a legitimate consideration in granting
relief.
In another case the court granted innocent spouse status because
the "omission was not of such character as to put a reasonably
prudent person possessed of [taxpayer's] experience and temperament
on notice." 0 The problem is that a spouse's experience and temperament may be such as to make the spouse imprudent. At that point,
engrafting a subjective component onto the reasonable person standard seems to result in an internal inconsistency. Nevertheless, courts
have appeared willing to consider the spouse's emotional state in
applying the reason to know requirement.81
Courts have relied on three specific factors in making the reason
to know determination: 1) unusual or lavish expenditures, 2) participation in business affairs or bookkeeping, and 3) the guilty spouse's
refusal to be forthright about the couple's finances.82 Lavish expen-

standard as "excluding consideration of the taxpayer's subjective condition when
assessing the reasonableness of her actions. But neither does it preclude the setting
of judicially-defined minima of reasonable prudence for individual taxpayers or class
of taxpayers." Id. at 166 n.5. Accord Smith v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H)
87-226, 1090 (1987) ("state of the spouse's cognitive faculties" a permissible inquiry);
Padgett v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-130, 657 (1987) ("whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances of the taxpayer" could be expected to
know); Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 85-278, 1242 (1985) (omission
was not of such character as to put "a reasonably prudent person possessed of
[taxpayer's] experience and temperament" on notice); Cox v. Commissioner, 51
T.C.M. (P-H) 82-723, 3138 (1982) (spouse a heavily sedated schizoid); Young v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80-531, 2261 (1980) (spouse's emotional state
considered, but relief still not granted); Gross v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H)
80-186, 867 (1980) (standard is "whether a reasonable person in [taxpayer's]
subjective position would have known").
80. Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (PH) 85-278, 1242 (1985) (emphasis
added).
81. A few cases have been less generous than most in applying the reason to
know requirement. E.g., Estate of Jackson, 72 T.C. 356 (1979). See supra text
accompanying notes 65-68. In Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986),
the court said the primary ingredients of the requirement are "(1) the circumstances
which face the [taxpayer]; and (2) whether a reasonable person in the same position
would infer that omissions or erroneous deductions had been made." Id. at 565-66.
It denied relief to a wife who argued she should be granted relief because during the
tax year "her daughter was married, her son graduated from high school, her father
had a 75th birthday, an addition to the house was built and her husband began
drinking more heavily." Id. at 563.
82. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 506 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975); Wolfram
v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-422, 2192, 2196 (1987); Smith v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-226, 1090, 1092 (1987); DeMartino v. Commissioner,
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ditures by the couple indicate not only knowledge of omitted income,
but by extension, that it is not inequitable to hold both spouses
liable. 3 Participation in financial affairs or bookkeeping is an obvious
.factor in determining whether a spouse had actual or constructive
knowledge and whether it is inequitable to hold the spouse liable.
Voluntary complicity in the understatement of tax obviates other
equitable considerations. Several cases have cited this as a factor for
denying relief.8 4 Refusal of the "guilty" spouse to be forthright about
family finances has cut both ways. In some cases such behavior has
been held to put the other spouse on notice,85 while in others, secrecy
on the part of the guilty spouse has been a factor in granting relief.8 6
Taxpayers have sometimes attempted to make a distinction between knowledge of the facts pertaining to a transaction and knowledge of the tax consequences of the transaction. For example, in
McCoy v. Commissioner,7 the husband and his partner caused their
partnership to be incorporated. The liabilities of the partnership
transferred to the corporation exceeded the adjusted basis of the assets
transferred, and gain, therefore, had to be recognized under section
357(c).88 The wife asserted innocent spouse status on the ground that

55 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-263, 1103, 1119 (1986); Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M.
(P-H) 85-478, 2140, 2145 (1985); Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85278, 1242, 1247 (1985); Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76-121, 541,
548 (1976).
83. See Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698 (1972).
84. See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-1070 (Cl. Ct.
1984) at 84-1072; Hyon v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-218, 1046, 1049
(1987) (wife familiar with operation and profits of stores, used store profit for
personal living expenses); Coulter v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-121, 622,
629 (1987) (wife knew about income and could have determined omission of income).
85. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973); Alberts v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-483, 2195, 2199 (1986) (husband not forthright
about business records and finance; wife controlled personal account checkbook);
Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85-478, 2140, 2145-46 (1985) (husband
should have been on notice due to wife's prior embezzlement).
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-226, 1090, 1092
(1987); DeMartino v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-263, 1103, 1120 (1986)
(wife would not have understood husband's straddle transactions if they were
explained); Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 85-278, 1242, 1247 (1985);
Cox v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H)
82-723, 3138, 3143 (1982); Ratner v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81-333, 1169, 1178-79 (1981).
87. 57 T.C. 732 (1972); accord Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812 (1985).
88. I.R.C. § 357(c) provides in relevant part as follows:
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.(1) In general.-In the case of an exchange-
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she was unaware of the tax consequences of incorporating the partnership. The court rejected this argument, stating:
[W]e do not think section 6013(e) was designed to abate joint
and several liability where the lack of knowledge of the omitted
income is predicated on mere ignorance of the legal tax

consequences of transactions the facts of which are either in
the possession of the spouse seeking relief or reasonably within
his reach.8 9

The wife knew generally about husband's business and she knew the

contents of the returns. The fact that she did not know the tax
consequences of the transactions reported on the returns did not save
her. 9o
Subsequent to McCoy, courts have consistently distinguished

between ignorance of the facts of a transaction and ignorance of the
transaction's tax consequences by denying relief in the latter situation. 9' However, the distinction is easier to state than to apply. For
example, if one spouse believes that the receipt of money by the other
is a gift, is that ignorance of the transaction or of the transaction's
tax consequences? 92 The McCoy court did not engage in any detailed
(A) to which section 351 applies, .

Id.

.

. if the sum of the amount of

the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the liabilities to which the property
is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property transferred
pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not a
capital asset, as the case may be.
89. 57 T.C. at 734.
90. Id. at 734-35.

91. See, e.g., Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1981);
Smith v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 651, 673 (1978); Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.
223, 230 (1974); McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972); Vesco v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-374, 1450, 1454 (1979).
92. One case seemed to accept the proposition that good faith belief that receipt
of money is a gift would entitle a spouse to relief. However, the court found in that
case that the spouse could not have believed in good faith that receipt of the money
was a gift. Altman v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1973). However, in
Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1981), the court rejected a similar
argument by the spouse. The spouse argued that she believed that $30,000 she received
from her husband represented the proceeds of a foreign sale and that such foreign
income was not gross income. She contended that while "relief from joint liability
cannot be predicated on ignorance regarding the taxability of known amounts of
gross income, it can be predicated on ignorance regarding whether certain income is
viewed as 'gross income' for tax purposes." Id. at 224. The court rejected this
argument and imposed liability on the spouse. Id.
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analysis of the wife's knowledge. It merely stated she was generally
aware of the husband's business situation. 93 But if she did know that
the liabilities of the partnership exceeded the adjusted basis of the
assets transferred to the corporation, it would be correct to say that
she was ignorant of the facts of the transaction, not merely the
transaction's tax consequences.
Even though the ignorance of facts versus ignorance of tax
consequences distinction is intellectually disturbing, fortunately, it has
caused inequitable results in few cases.Y Moreover, the problems
associated with an ignorance of the law defense are a strong argument
favoring retention of the distinction.9 5
Overall, the knowledge requirement has operated in a fairly
equitable manner. Admittedly there have been a few cases, such as
Jackson, where the knowledge requirement may have resulted in
inequity. Nevertheless, any general standard is likely to produce
unanticipated results on occasion. It has been suggested that regulations specifying the knowledge requirement should be issued.96 The
difficulty with this suggestion is that greater specificity on the level
of general rules may result in an outcome opposite of that intended.
That is, strict adherence to detailed rules may result in*more rather
than fewer cases where the result is intuitively unfair.
D.

BENEFIT/EQUITY REQUIREMENT

The benefit/equity requirement is at the heart of the rationale
for providing innocent spouse relief. The committee reports on the
1971 legislation specifically alluded to the "grave injustice" of holding
the innocent spouse liable for the other spouse's tax misdeeds. 97 The
statute required that in determining the inequity of holding a spouse
liable, the decision maker should take into account whether or not
the spouse seeking relief "benefited directly or indirectly from the

93. 57 T.C. at 734.
94. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 651 (1978) (spouse benefited
significantly from omitted income); Allen v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86125, 524 (1986) (spouse benefited significantly from omitted income); Vesco v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-374, 1450 (1979) (spouse significantly benefited

from omitted income).

95. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 n.14 (5th Cir. 1975).

96. Lewis, Innocent Spouse Cases: Comments Inspired by Professor Borison's
Article, 40 TAx LAW. 865, 869 (1987).

97. H.R. Rep. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
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items omitted from gross income" and "all other facts and circumt-

ances. "98
Many cases devolved into a question of whether the spouse

seeking relief had received a significant benefit from the omitted
income. 99 Whether a spouse has "significantly benefited" is a factual
question. 1°° However, there are certain guidelines formulated by the
Treasury and courts. For example, it is clear that "ordinary support"
received by an innocent spouse does not constitute a significant
benefit. 10' However, large marital settlements, inheritances, life insurance proceeds and the like may constitute significant benefit.102 In
some instances courts have been quite liberal in their definition of
ordinary support, thereby according innocent spouse treatment to
spouses who had lived quite well off the other spouse's income. 0 3 A
court may also determine that holding the spouse liable is inequitable,
even though the spouse has significantly benefited from the other
spouse's income.104 Overall, the significant benefit/equity requirement
has not been troublesome.
98. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 6013(e)(1)(C) prior to 1984 amendment.
The 1984 legislation deleted specific reference to "significant benefit." However, the
Committee Reports make clear that "significant benefit" remains an important factor
in determining the equitableness of holding a spouse liable. Staff of Joint Comm. on
Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Gen. Explanation of H.R. 4170 at 722 (Comm. Print
1984).
99. E.g., Busse v. United States, 542 F.2d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 1975); Dakil v.
United States, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974); Zinser v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(P-H) 78-256, 1096, 1100 (1978); Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76122, 545, 548 (1976).

100. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 170 (5th Cir. 1975); Dakil v.
United States, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974); Zinser v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(P-H) 78-256, 1096, 1100 (1978); Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76122, 545, 548 (1976).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (1974).
102. Id.
The Internal Revenue Service has instructed its agents that the innocent
spouse will not be considered to have benefitted from the omitted income
if the other spouse used the income to: (a) gamble with or pay gambling
debts, (b) support extramarital situations, (c) benefit third parties, (d)
purchase separately held assets, (e) maintain separate bank accounts, or (f)
support a living style not enjoyed by the innocent spouse.
Int. Rev. Man. Audit (CCH) Part IV-45(11)(20).
103. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1975);
DeMartino v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-263, 1103, 1120 (1986) (standard
of living high but substantially unchanged during the year at issue); Zinser v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78-256, 1096, 1100 (1978) ($56,000 property in
divorce settlement).
104. See Busse v. United States, 542 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir. 1976) ("any benefit
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IV.

1984

LEGISLATION

Over the years it became apparent that the 1971 legislation
contained defects, such as the substantial omission of income requirement, that resulted in otherwise innocent spouses being held liable for
taxes that it was inequitable for them to pay. Congress initially
undertook to remedy these defects by amending section 6013(e) in the
Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983.103 This bill
was subsequently consolidated (with changes) into the Tax Reform
Act of 1984.1° This legislation liberalized the statute by dropping the
25 percent omission of income requirement and also by permitting
innocent spouse relief where the tax deficiency was caused by an
improper deduction, basis, or credit as well as where 'there was an
omission of income. It also repealed the incorporation by reference
of the section 6501(e)(1)(A) definition of income. However, the legislation also imposed some additional restrictions on relief in certain
circumstances. 07

found must be considered in the totality of circumstances"); Sanders v. United States,
509 F.2d 162, 170 (5th Cir. 1975); Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th
Cir. 1974) (not convinced, benefits were significant; even if they were, there were
overwhelming equitable considerations to require innocent spouse relief); Bacher v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77-082, 364, 370 (1977); Hackney v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 76-099, 411, 418 (1976).
105. H.R. 3475, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1983).
106. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 425, 98 Stat. 801 (1984).
107. I.R.C. § 6013(e) as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-369 reads as follows:
(e)

SPOUSE RELIEVED OF LIABILrry IN CERTAIN CASES.-

(1)

IN

(A)
year,

GEnERAL.-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, ifa joint return has been made under this section for a taxable

(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax
attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse,
(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or
she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such
substantial understatement, and
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax
for such taxable year attributable to such substantial understatement,

(2)

GROSSLY ERRONEOUS ITEMS.-For

purposes of this subsection, the

term "grossly erroneous items" means, with respect to any spouse(A) any item of gross income attributable to such spouse which
is omitted from gross income, and
(B) any claim of a deduction, credit, or basis by such spouse in
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$500 UNDERSTATEMENT

First, the 1984 legislation requires that an "understatement" must

exceed $500 in order for the spouse to be eligible for relief. 08 Section

6013(e)(3) defines the term "understatement" by reference to section
6661(b)(2) which defines the term for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty. This definition refers only to the amount of
tax owed, exclusive of interest and penalties. 10 9 Therefore, a spouse is
ineligible for relief even if the total amount of liability at stake exceeds

an amount for which there is no basis in fact or law.

(3)

SUBSTANTIAL UNDERSTATEMENT.-For

purposes of this subsection,

the term "substantial understatement" means any understatement (as defined in section 6661(b)(2)(A) which exceeds $500.
(4) UNDERSTATEMENT MUST EXCEED SPECIFIED PERCENTAGE OF SPOUSE'S
INCOME.-

(A) ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME OF $20,000 OR LESS.-If the spouse's
adjustment gross income for the preadjustment year is $20,000 or less,
this subsection shall apply only if the liability described in paragraph
(1) is greater than 10 percent of such adjusted gross income.

(B)

ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME OF MORE THAN

(C)

PREADJUSTMENT

$20,000.-If the

spouse's adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year is more
than $20,000, subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting "25
percent" for "10 percent."

YEAR.-For purposes of this paragraph, the

term "preadjustment year" means the most recent taxable year of the
spouse ending before the date the deficiency notice is mailed.
(D) COMPUTATION OF SPOUSE'S ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-If the
spouse is married to another spouse at the close of the preadjustment
year, the spouse's adjusted gross income shall include the income of
the new spouse (whether or not they file a joint return).
(E) EXCEPTION FOR OMISSIONS FROM GROSS iNcoE.-This paragraph shall not apply to any liability attributable to the omission of
an item from gross income.
(5) SPECIAL RULE FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY INcoME.-For purposes
of this subsection, the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attributable shall be
made without regard to community property laws.
108. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3).
109. i.R.C. § 6661(b)(2) reads as follows:

(2)

UNDERSTATEMENT.-

(A) In general.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "understatement" means the excess of (i) the amount of the tax required to be shown on the return
for the taxable year, over;
• (ii) the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the return,
reduced by any rebate (within the meaning of section 6211 (b)(2)).
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$500 including interest and penalties, as long as the amount of tax in
dispute is below $500.11 0
This $500 threshold applies in all cases under section 6013(e). It
has the effect of denying any relief in cases where the amount at
stake is relatively small, falling disproportionately on lower income
taxpayers. Tax liability of $500 plus interest and penalties is a substantial amount for many such taxpayers."'
B.

PREADJUSTMENT YEAR AMOUNT

The statute imposes an additional dollar amount requirement
where the understatement results from an erroneous claim of a
deduction, credit or basis."12 This limitation is based on the spouse's
adjusted gross income (AGI) for the "preadjustment year," defined
as "the most recent taxable year of the spouse ending before the date
the deficiency notice is mailed.""'
If the spouse's AGI for the
preadjustment year is $20,000 or less, the spouse is eligible for relief
only if the liability exceeds 10 percent of AGI for that year." 4 For
this purpose, the liability is the liability relieved by section 6013(e)(1)
and, therefore, includes interest and penalties."15 If the spouse's
preadjustment year AGI exceeds $20,000 the liability must exceed 25
6
percent of AGI for the spouse to be eligible for relief."
This requirement was added to the bill in the conference committee." 7 Its purpose is not immediately apparent, but presumably it
is intended to limit relief in deduction, credit and basis cases to
situations where the amount of liability is substantial in relation to
the spouse's income. As discussed subsequently," 8 this requirement is
unrelated to the equitable purposes of the statute and is structurally
defective.
110. See Farmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 1163, 1165 (6th Cir. 1986): ("Stripped
of statutory verbiage, an understatement appears to be the difference between the
tax due as reported on the return and as computed by the IRS."); accord, Johnson
v. Commissiorier, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-331, 1485 (1986).
111. See Lewis, supra note 95, at 871-72.
112. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4). This requirement does not apply when the understatement of tax results from an erroneous omission of income. § 6013(e)(4)(E).
113. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(C).
114. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A).
115. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1),(4)(A); Johnson v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (PH) 86-331, 1485 (1986).
116. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(B). If the spouse is married to a new spouse at the close
of the preadjustment year, the spouse's AGI includes the income of the new spouse.
Id. at § 6013(e)(4)(D).
117. See H.R. Rep; No. 861, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1119 (1984).
118. See infra text accompanying notes 152-157.
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NO BASIS IN FACT OR LAW

The last restriction added by the 1984 Act also applies only to

an erroneous deduction, credit or basis; not to an omission from

income. It requires that the item of deduction, credit or basis be
grossly erroneous. For items of deduction, credit or basis, the statute
defines "grossly erroneous item" as "any claim of a deduction, credit,
or basis . . for which there is no basis in fact or law." 1 9
This requirement has already caused considerable difficulty in
the short period of its existence. There is, first of all, the question of
whether the phrase "no basis in fact or law" is conjunctive or
disjunctive. A deduction would have no basis in fact if the taxpayer
made no actual payment or incurred no actual liability. For example,
there would be no basis in fact for a travel expense deduction where
the taxpayer incurred no travel expenses. A deduction would have no
basis in law where, although the taxpayer made a payment or incurred
a liability, the expenditure was of a type not eligible for deduction.
For example, there would be no basis in law for deducting the expenses
of a purely personal trip. The cases thus far decided seem to have
read the requirement in the disjunctive, so as to afford relief if there
is either no basis in fact or no basis in law. 120
119. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B).
120. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief:

A Call for Legislative and Judicial Liberalization, 40 TAx LAW. 819 (1987). A
deduction with no basis in law satisfied the court in Junker v. Commissioner, 56
T.C.M. (P-H) 87-103, 534 (1987). In Junker, the husband invested in a video tax
shelter. The tax shelter's sole purpose was to reduce or eliminate income taxes. The
husband did not have a profit making intention with respect to his investment. The
husband deducted his tax shelter loss on the joint tax return. The court held that the
deduction was a grossly erroneous item, because it had no basis in law. Id. at 536.
In United States v. Flomenhoft, No. 86 C 1588, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ill., Feb.
27, 1987), the husband allegedly deducted expenses incurred by his children's and
grandchildren's trusts from his income tax. Flomenhoft never actually incurred any
of the deducted expenses. The Flomenhoft court determined that the deduction had
no basis in fact and then stated that the deduction had no basis in fact or law. Slip
op. at 3-4.
Several courts have merely concluded that the spouse either did meet, see Killiam
v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-365, 1829, 1832 (1987); Padgett v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87-130, 657, 662 (1987) (parties stipulated that deductions
had no basis in fact or law); De Martino v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 86-263,
1103, 1119 n.26 (1986), or did not meet, see Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758,
763 (1986); Gorman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86-344, 1531, 1539 (1986)
(wife put in no evidence to meet § 6013(e) requirements); Mary v. Commissioner, 54
T.C.M. (P-H) 85-261, 1149, 1150 (1985), the burden of showing that the deductions
had no basis in fact or law without further specifying how they reached this
conclusion.
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A more daunting question is precisely what does the term "no
basis in fact or law" mean. The legislative history offers scant
guidance. The House Report states only that innocent spouse relief
"may be desirable, for example, where one spouse claims phony
business deductions in order to avoid paying tax and the other spouse
has no reason to know that the deductions are phony."'' 21 The House
Report mentions the "phony" deduction situation merely as an
example. It does not purport to limit relief to that single situation.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court has emphasized the House Report's use
of the word "phony" when it has decided cases involving the meaning
of "no basis in fact or law. ' 122
The clearest example of the Tax Court's approach to the issue is
Douglas v. Commissioner. 23 Mr. Douglas, a window salesman, claimed
employee business expense deductions of $1910.15 and $7,660.20 on
the couple's joint tax returns for 1979 and 1980 respectively. Mr.
Douglas subsequently died. 24 These deductions were disallowed by
the Commissioner, apparently for lack of substantiation. 125 The Commissioner also asserted a deficiency caused by $15,128.96 of omitted
income.
The parties agreed that Mrs. Douglas satisfied both the knowledge
and equitability tests for innocent spouse status with respect to the
omitted gross income. 26 Furthermore, the Commissioner conceded
that Mrs. Douglas satisfied these requirements with respect to the
disallowed deductions.' 27 However, the Commissioner asserted that
Mrs. Douglas failed to satisfy the "no basis in fact or law" standard
required for innocent spouse status with respect to the disallowed
deductions. 28 Mrs. Douglas was able to substantiate $5,761.20 of the
disallowed expenses for 1980. However, she was unable to substantiate
the remainder of the claimed expenses, and failed to offer any evidence
with respect to these deductions. 29 Mrs. Douglas argued that "the
mere fact that [the deductions] have been disallowed, after Petitioner
121. H.R. Rep. No. 432, supra note 97, at 1502. There is also a question as to
whether the no basis requirement applies to the claim itself or to the amount of the
claim. See Borison, supra note 119, at 857-58.
122. E.g., Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758 (1986); Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228 (1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987).
123. 86 T.C. 758 (1986) (appealed by Taxpayer to 10th Cir. July 27, 1987).
124. Id. at 759.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

760. An alimony deduction of $600 was also in dispute.
759.
761, n.3.
761.
759-60.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

diligently sought to prove their deductibility establishes that such
deductions have no basis in fact or law."' 130
The Tax Court rejected Mrs. Douglas' argument, noting that the
statute does not define the phrase "no basis in fact or law." However,
the court found "a clue to its meaning" in the reference to "phony
business deductions" in the House Committee Report.' The court
said that:
[A] deduction has no basis in fact when the expense for which
the deduction is claimed was never, in fact, made. A deduction
has no basis in law when the expense, even if made, does not
qualify as a deductible expense under well-settled legal principles or when no substantial legal argument can be made to
support its deductibility. Ordinarily, a deduction having no
basis in fact or in law can be described as frivolous, fraudulent,
or, to use the word of the committee report, phony. 132
Using this standard, the court found that Mrs. Douglas had not
carried her burden of proving that the deductions had no basis in fact
or law. The mere fact that the deductions were disallowed or lacked
substantiation was not sufficient to show that the deduction had no
basis in fact or law.' 33 Accordingly, the court denied innocent spouse
relief, even though the Commissioner had conceded the knowledge
and equitability requirements.134
Use of terms such as phony, fraudulent, frivolous, and groundless
as synonyms for "no basis in fact or law" add little to the specificity
of the phrase. The Douglas court did not clarify the issue by describing
"no basis in fact or law" with these words. M
130. Id. at 763.
131. Id. at 762-63.
132. Id. Courts have also used the term "groundless" as a synonym for "no

basis in fact or law." Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 1987);
Shenker v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986); Sivils v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.
79 (1986).
133. 86 T.C. at 763. The court said: "Petitioner may not rely on the disallowance
or her inability to substantiate the deductions alone to prove a lack of basis in fact
and law."
134. Id. at 761-63.
135. Id. at 762-63. For example, the word phony has a clear meaning in everyday
English, but phony does not have a precise legal definition. Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 609 (1953), is the only Supreme Court case where the word phony is
used in the text of an opinion. Justice Minton stated that, "[there is an abundance
of evidence . . . of a conspiracy to contract spurious, phony marriages for the
purpose of deceiving the immigration authorities." In this context, the word phony
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This lack of clarity is further illustrated by the disagreement of
two circuit courts on application of the requirement to virtually
identical sets of facts. Shenker v. Commissioner3 6 involved a deduction for worthless stock. Purcell v. Commissioner'3 7 involved deductions for worthless stock and for bad debts. In each case, entitlement
to the deduction was dependent on the taxpayer showing that the item
became worthless in the particular year in which the deduction was
claimed. The taxpayer was unable to carry this burden in either case
and the question became whether the spouse was relieved of liability
for the resulting deficiency under section 6013(e).
In Shenker the court afforded relief to the spouse. The court
found that the stock actually became worthless in 1972, not 1971, the
year for which the deduction was claimed. The court then reasoned
that since the deduction could only be claimed for the year the stock
became worthless, there was no basis for claiming the deduction for
1971.138 This reasoning begged the question. The issue was not whether
the stock actually became worthless in 1971. The issue was whether
there was a basis for taking the position that the stock became
worthless in 1971.
The Purcell court denied relief to the spouse on similar facts.
Although the court held that worthlessness did not actually occur
until a year subsequent to the claimed deductions, the court found
that there "was both an arguable factual and legal basis for claiming
them in the year in which they were taken.' 39
The "no basis in fact or law" requirement is obviously vague
and imprecise. Nevertheless, the practical result of the requirement is
clear. Combined with placing the burden of proof on the spouse, the
has the same meaning as when used by the typical layman. WEBSTER'S TIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1700 (1981). Despite Justice Minton's use of the word
phony, phony has not been adequately defined to be used as a legal term of art.
136. 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2460 (1987).

137. 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987).
138. Shenker, 804 F.2d at 115. The court said:
Section 165(a) permits deductions only for losses "sustained during the
taxable year." Therefore, for there to be some "basis in fact or law," §
6013(e)(2), for a deduction under § 165(a), there must be some basis not
only for claiming that a loss occurred, but also for claiming that it was
sustained during the taxable year in question. In the present case, the
findings of the Tax Court discussed above make clear that there was simply
no basis upon which Mr. Shenker could claim that the loss of his stock
occurred in 1971, rather than some later year.
Id. at 115.
139. Purcell, 826 F.2d at 476.
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requirement makes it very difficult for an otherwise deserving spouse
to obtain innocent spouse relief in cases where the deduction is not
obviously fraudulent or a sham.140 This is illustrated by the facts in

Purcell'41 and Douglas 42 where the spouses were severely hampered
by lack of actual knowledge of the transactions involved.
In a typical case where the guilty spouse has died or there has
been a divorce, records and other information essential to meeting
the standard for relief may be unavailable to the innocent spouse.
This is especially likely where, as is often the case, the innocent spouse

did not have access to the couple's financial data during the marriage.
By the same token, if the spouse does have adequate data available,
the Service may counter that the very availability of the data shows
that the spouse knew or should have known the deduction was

erroneous. 43 The net effect is that the "no basis in fact or law"
requirement has caused denial of relief to otherwise deserving spouses
and is likely to continue to do so as long as the requirement is retained
in its present form.

§ 6013(e)
The basic purpose of section 6013(e) has from its inception been
essentially to arrive at a result that conforms to intuitive notions of
fairness and equity.'" Several technical requirements in the statute
V.

PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO

have, however, acted to produce an opposite result. The requirement
that relief be granted only in cases where there was an omission of

140. See, e.g., Flomenhoft v. Commissioner, No. 86 C 15888, slip op. at 5
(N.D. Ill.,
Feb. 27, 1987); Killian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87365, 1829,
1832 (1987); DeMartino v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86263, 1103, 1120
(1986).
141. See 86 T.C. at 234. In Purcell the tax court granted innocent spouse relief
on certain omitted income items. The facts indicated that Mrs. Purcell did not
significantly benefit from the omitted items. During the tax years in question Mr.
Purcell was drinking heavily, was away from home most of the time, and was seeing
a woman friend whom he married after Mr. and Mrs. Purcell were divorced. 86 T.C.
at 231.
142. 86 T.C. at 760, 763. In Douglas the parties agreed that Mrs. Douglas met
the lack of knowledge and equitability requirements for omission from income relief.
86 T.C. at 759.
143. See Borison, supra note 119, at 854.
144. See H. Rep. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970); S.Rep. No. 1537,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). In Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1975), the court said that "Congress intended [§ 6013(e)] to remedy a perceived
injustice and we should not hinder that praiseworthy intent by giving [§ 6013(e)] an
unduly narrow or restrictive meaning. Id. at 166-67. Accord Dakil v. Commissioner,
496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974).
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gross income in the amount of 25 percent of the gross income stated
on the tax return, along with the technical definition of gross income
incorporated in that requirement, produced several cases in which
relief was denied where notions of fairness and equity dictated that
relief should be granted. 45 In 1984, legislation resolved this defect by
repealing the 25 percent omission of income requirement and removing
the technical definition of gross income from section 6013(e).1 46 However, the enactment of additional technical requirements for relief by
the 1984 act partially undid the good accomplished. These additional
requirements should be removed from the statute, or, at the very
least, substantially liberalized.
A.

$500 UNDERSTATEMENT REQUIREMENT

The statute now requires that there be an understatement of tax
of at least $500 in order for a spouse to be eligible for relief. This
absolute amount requirement is'apparently intended to serve as a de
minimis cut-off. The original legislative proposal required that an
understatement exceed the lesser of ten percent of the tax required to
be shown on the return or $500. 14 The ultimate legislation, however,
was more stringent, requiring at least a $500 understatement in every
case. The term understatement as used in section 6013(e) is defined
in section 6661(b)(2)(A) as the difference between the tax required to
be shown on the return and the tax actually reported. Hence, the
48
$500 floor does not include any interest or penalties.1
The $500 understatement requirement tends to disproportionately
prohibit relief for lower income taxpayers, since these taxpayers are
most likely to have smaller tax liabilities. 49 The requirement was
apparently meant to lighten the Service's administrative burden by
screening out small cases. However, a 1987 statement by the Chief of
145. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
146. The change in definition of gross income effectuated by the 1984 legislation
ultimately resulted in Mrs. LaBelle, see supra text accompanying notes 1-14, obtaining
innocent spouse relief when her case was remanded. LaBelle v. Commissioner, 55
T.C.M. (P-H) 86-602, 2817 (1986). The court decided that repeal of the incorporation by reference of the definition of gross income contained in § 6511(e)(1)(A)
resulted in an overstatement of gross income being equivalent to an omission from
gross income under amended § 6013(e). Accordingly, Mrs. LaBelle needed only to
meet the lack of knowledge and equitability requirements (not the no basis in fact or
law requirement) to qualify for innocent spouse relief. 1986-602 T.C.M. (P-H) at 862819.
147. Jt. Comm. Description of H.R. 3475, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1983).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 107-110.
149. See Lewis, supra note 95, at 871-72.
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the IRS Appeals Division indicated that repeal of the $500 floor would
not have an adverse administative impact.1o
This requirement should be repealed. It does not appear to serve
any valid compelling purpose. It does prevent relief in situations
where the equities dictate that relief should be granted.", If Congress
rejects outright repeal on the ground that a de minimis provision of
some kind is still necessary, the provision proposed in the original
legislation requiring the understatement to be the lesser of $500 or
ten percent of the tax required to be shown on the return 5 2 would be
preferable to the present requirement.
B.

PREADJUSTMENT YEAR REQUIREMENT

For understatements caused by an erroneous deduction, credit or
basis, there is an additional requirement that the liability from which
relief is sought exceed specified percentages of the spouse's adjusted
gross income (AGI) for the "preadjustment year."' This requirement
does not apply to an understatement caused by an omission of gross
income. 14 The preadjustment year is defined as the most recent taxable
year of the spouse ending before the date the deficiency notice is
mailed.' The requirement is that the liability must be greater than
ten percent of the spouse's preadjustment year AGI if the spouse's
preadjustment year AGI is $20,000 or less. In cases where the spouse's
preadjustment year AGI is more than $20,000, the liability must be
at least 25 percent of the preadjustment year AGI.156
This provision is defective in at least three ways. First, it imposes
an unreasonably large amount requirement in order for innocent
150. Statement of Howard Martin, Chief, Internal Revenue Service Appeals
Division, as reported in Minutes of ABA Section of Taxation Committee on Low
Income Taxpayers, August 8, 1987. A Task Force of the Low Income Taxpayers
Committee under the leadership of Professor Jerome Borison of the University of
Denver College of Law has drafted proposed legislation to improve § 6013(e). Many
of the suggestions presented here are also in that draft legislation. The Joint
Committee Staff indicated in the 1984 Bluebook that the 1984 liberalizing legislation
was expected to have a negligible revenue effect. General Explanation of H.R. 4170,
supra note 97, at 723.
151. See Lewis, supra note 95, at 871-72.
152. See supra note 146.
153. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 6013(e)(4)(C). Thus if the deficiency notice is mailed in 1988, the
preadjustment year for a calendar year taxpayer is 1987.
156. Id. § 6013(e)(4)(A), (B). The amount of liability referred to is the amount
of liability from which relief is granted under § 6013(e)(1) and, therefore, includes
interest and penalties. Farmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 1986).
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spouse relief to be granted. For example, a spouse with an AGI of
$19,000 would have to have a liability of at least $1900 in order to
even be considered for relief. That is a very sizeable amount of tax
for a person in that income category.
Second, the requirement is presumably intended to restrict relief
to cases where payment would present a substantial hardship to the
spouse. However, in certain cases the spouse's preadjustment year
income may not be relevant to the ability to pay when payment is
actually due. The spouse's income in the year the deficiency is asserted
would seem more appropriate.
Finally, the provision produces an anomalous cliff effect caused
by the fact that for any AGI over $20,000, liability must be 25 percent
of AGI, without any phase-in of the 25 percent requirement. The 25
percent requirement is not limited to amounts in excess of $20,000. It
applies to the full amount of all AGi whenever AGI exceeds $20,000.
Therefore, a taxpayer having exactly $20,000 AGI would be required
to have a liability of $2000. However, a taxpayer with an AGI of,
for example, $20,100 would be required to have a liability of 25
percent of the full $20,100, or $5025.111
The preadjustment year requirement was not in the original bill,
but was added by the Conference Committee.' 8 If this requirement
were intended as a de minimis screening-out device, it goes far beyond
its purpose. The percentage liabilities required are substantial amounts.
If the provision is meant as a device to screen out unworthy deduction,
credit and basis cases, it is unnecessary. The equitability and knowledge requirements should be sufficient to police the deduction area,
just as they are sufficient to police the omission from income area.
In short, this requirement is an inappropriate device to accomplish
objectives that can be otherwise accomplished. It should be eliminated
from the statute.
C.

NO BASIS IN FACT OR LAW REQUIREMENT

The statute also requires in cases of deduction, credit or basis
that the item have no basis in fact or law. 5 9 As discussed previousiy,' 60
this requirement has resulted in an almost insurmountable barrier to
relief where the taxpayer is handicapped by a lack of knowledge
157. Compare I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) with § 6013(e)(4)(B). The statute also
requires that the income of an innocent spouse's new husband or wife be included
for purposes of this computation. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(D).
158. H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1119 (1984).
159. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(B).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 118-142.
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concerning the other spouse's handling of financial affairs. The
requirement was included in the legislation, apparently as an addi-

tional mechanism for policing innocent spouse claims in the deduction,
credit and basis areas.' 6' However, this requirement does not appear
to be necessary. In the main, courts have given relief under the equity

and knowledge requirements where it is appropriate and have denied
it in cases where relief is inappropriate. 162 There is no reason to believe
that courts would be any more remiss with respect to deductions than
courts have been when dealing with omissions from income.
The no basis in fact or law requirement essentially acts as a

technical deterrent to relief in cases where relief would otherwise be
granted. It is similar to the old 25 percent omission of income
requirement in this respect. Congress saw fit to eliminate the 25
percent omission of income requirement in the 1984 legislation, presumably because it had caused inequitable results in many cases.

Congress should also seriously consider eliminating the no basis in
fact or law standard for the same reason.
If outright repeal of the no basis in fact or law standard is
considered too drastic, then Congress should consider at least making
it easier to qualify for relief when the understatement is caused by an
erroneous deduction. This could be accomplished, for example, by a

161. For ease of expression this discussion will simply refer to the deduction
area, since erroneous deductions have been the most frequent situation where the no
basis in fact or law issue has arisen.
162. Relief granted under knowledge and equity requirements: see, e.g., Dakil
v. United States, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974) (wife was housewife after
husband's death; received social security and worked part-time); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698-700 (1972) (after guilty spouse died, not even FBI or IRS
could trace misappropriated funds; impossible for wife to benefit significantly or
have knowledge); Feingold v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80-163, 770, 772
(1980) (money received from husband proved insufficient even as ordinary support);
Miriani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 76-122, 545, 548 (1976) (only small
percentage of spouse's assets came from husband's unreported income). Relief denied
under knowledge and equity requirements: see, e.g., Estate of Gryder v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1983) (wife received title to considerable amount
of property purchased with unreported income); Schmidt v. United States, 53
A.F.T.R.2d 84-543 at 87-1072 to 1073 (Cl. Ct. 1984) (wife used proceeds from
unreported property sale to buy other property and pay her children's college and
law school tuition); Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303-04 (1973) (husband
unable to prove windfall divorce settlement wasn't a significant benefit); Evans v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82-700, 3056, 3062-63 (1982) (life-style of wife
dramatically improved within a year after husband began receiving unreported
income); Vesco v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-374, 1450, 1454 (1979) (wife
lived with fugitive husband and all his assets in Costa Rica).
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provision stating that, if the Commissioner imposes a negligence
penalty, then that penalty would automatically establish that the
deduction lacked a basis in fact or law. This would establish a brightline test and would prevent the Commissioner from having it both
ways. That is, it would prevent the Commissioner from contending
that the deduction had inadequate basis for purposes of making the
negligence penalty appropriate, while at the same time contending
that the deduction had adequate basis for purposes of making innocent
spouse relief inappropriate. The better alternative, however, is simply
to eliminate the no basis in fact or law requirement from the statute,
along with the other technical requirements. This would leave the
knowledge and equity requirements as the only criteria for relief.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The maze of nonequitable technical requirements that one seeking
innocent spouse relief must satisy has hampered equitable relief under
section 6013(e). The statute should simply require that in order for
equitable relief to be granted, the basic equitable conditions of section
6013(e) must be satisfied. The statute should require only that the
innocent spouse had no actual knowledge and no reason to know of
the understatement of tax, and that to charge the innocent spouse
with liability would be inequitable.
It may be contended that removing all of the technical requirements from the statute would open the way for an innocent spouse
claim to be made in every case. However, there appears to be no
objective data to verify that this would happen. As of September
1987, there were 250 innocent spouse cases pending nationwide.63
Note that this small number has occurred under a statute that, for
omissions of gross income, contains only equitable requirements
outside of the $500 requirement.
The Service and the courts do not appear to be flooded with
innocent spouse cases. The burden should be on those who claim that
the suggestions made here would unnecessarily burden the Service and
the courts to show that they would, in fact, do so. There is no doubt
that any technical requirement will in some cases result in inequity,
because the technical requirement will inevitably prevent relief in some
situations where relief would otherwise be equitable. This is illustrated
in the omission of income cases.'64 In a situation where a requirement
163. Minutes of ABA Section of Taxation Committee on Low Income Taxpayers
Meeting August 8, 1987 (statement of Howard Martin, Chief of Internal Revenue
Service Appeals Division).

164. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
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admittedly will result in inequitable consequences, the burden should
be on the proponents of that requirement to show that it is otherwise
necessary.
There is no good reason to deny relief to a deserving innocent
spouse based on technical requirements as to amounts of liability in
relation to gross income, nor is there good reason to deny relief based
on the nebulous and difficult-to-meet standard of no basis in fact or
law. The equitable purposes of the statute would be better served if
these requirements were eliminated. The argument that to eliminate
these requirements would unnecessarily burden the Service and the
courts is not persuasive. In an income tax code so voluminous and so
technical that it is beyond the scope of the human mind to comprehend, the denial of relief to the innocent spouse is an inappropriate
place to begin to search for administrative ease.

